This study examines the audit pricing by the auditor of a parent company (i.e., principal auditor) when other independent auditors who are not affiliated with the principal auditor (i.e., other auditors) are involved in the audit of the group financial statements. Using Korean data, we find that audit fees charged to the parent company by the principal auditor are negatively associated with the proportion of total assets or sales of subsidiaries audited by other auditors in the pre-IFRS period. This finding is consistent with the argument that the principal auditor views subsidiaries audited by other auditors as a business opportunity to attract new clients and thus offers fee discounts to its client. However, in the post-IFRS period, this negative relation between audit fees and the involvement of other auditors becomes insignificant or positive, suggesting that IFRS adoption restricts auditors' strategic behavior in audit pricing because IFRS adoption increases the audit complexity and risk associated with the involvement of other auditors.
INTRODUCTION
In the audit of group financial statements, some components of the group financial statements (e.g., subsidiaries) are often audited by other independent auditors (i.e., component auditors), who may or may not be affiliated with the auditor of the parent company (i.e., principal auditor). 1 For example, about 55% of audit engagements performed by U.S. global network firms use component auditors, and this figure increases to 80% for large client firms (i.e., the Fortune 500 issuers) (PCAOB 2016) . Recently, regulators and standard setters expressed concern about the quality of group audits involving component auditors (IAASB 2015; PCAOB 2016) .
This study examines the association between audit fees charged to the parent company by the principal auditor and the involvement of other auditors who are not affiliated with the principal auditor (hereafter, 'other auditors') in group audits. 2, 3 We use data from South Korea (hereafter 'Korea') where information about the proportion of total assets and sales of subsidiaries audited by other auditors is disclosed in audit reports. We also examine the effect of International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption in Korea on the relation between the principal auditor's audit pricing and the involvement of other auditors. 1 For ease of presentation, we use the terms 'principal auditor', 'the auditor of the parent company', and 'the parent company's auditor' interchangeably in our paper. While they are similar to 'group engagement team' used in International Standard on Auditing (hereafter 'ISA') 600, we use the term 'an auditor' at the audit firm level, rather than at the engagement team level. 2 ISA 600 defines a component auditor as 'an auditor who, at the request of the group engagement team, performs work on financial information related to a component for the group audit (Para. 9(b))'. The concept of component auditors in ISA 600 includes (i) a member of the group engagement team (Para. A7) and (ii) an auditor who is not affiliated with the group engagement team. In our study, we use the term 'other auditors' to refer to the latter only, a component auditor who is not affiliated with the principal auditor. 3 We use audit fees charged to a parent company by the principal auditor, as disclosed in the annual report of the parent company. Thus, our audit fee measure does not include audit fees paid by the subsidiaries to the component auditors who are affiliated with the principal auditor or those paid to other auditors (i.e., component auditors who are not affiliated with the principal auditor). Fees for non-audit services are not included in our measure of audit fees.
Two competing predictions exist about the principal auditor's audit pricing when a significant portion of subsidiaries are audited by other auditors. On the one hand, the principal auditor can charge higher audit fees to the parent company because the involvement of other auditors increases audit complexity and audit risk ('the audit complexity view'). To ensure the quality of the group audit, the principal auditor plans and supervises audits performed by other auditors and communicates with them throughout the audit process, which involves additional effort. In addition, the involvement of other auditors can also increase audit risk for the group audit because other auditors may not detect a material misstatement in the financial statements of subsidiaries, which could cause a material misstatement in the group financial statements (ISA 600). Therefore, the principal auditor is expected to charge a fee premium to compensate for the higher audit effort and audit risk associated with the involvement of other auditors. On the other hand, an alternative view predicts that the principal auditor strategically charges low audit fees to the parent company because the current involvement of other auditors can provide the principal auditor with a potential business opportunity to attract new clients in the future ('the business opportunity view'). The principal auditor may be able to acquire the subsidiaries currently audited by other auditors as new clients, by leveraging its relationship with the parent company. Therefore, the principal auditor may strategically charge low audit fees to the parent company, anticipating that it can recoup its fee discount by acquiring more clients in subsequent periods. This strategic behavior in audit pricing is expected particularly when the overall audit complexity and risk associated with the involvement of other auditors are relatively low. Taken together, the association between the principal auditor's audit fees and the involvement of other auditors is an empirical question.
Next, we examine whether and how the adoption of IFRS in Korea affects the principal auditor's audit pricing when other auditors are involved. Since IFRS are more principles-based and fair-value oriented compared with the former Korean Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (hereafter 'K-GAAP'), after IFRS adoption, auditors are required to use more professional judgement to provide assurance in complex and subjective financial reporting processes. Consistent with these arguments, Kim, Liu, and Zheng (2012) and De George, Ferguson, and Spear (2013) find that post-IFRS audit fees increase, reflecting increases in audit effort and risk premium in the post-IFRS period. More specific to the Korean audit market, the consolidated financial statements, which are often regarded under K-GAAP as supplement information to the non-consolidated ones, have become the primary financial statements that must be submitted in the annual filings in the post-IFRS period. This change has substantially increased the importance of consolidated financial statements in financial reporting and the scrutiny on them. In addition, the post-IFRS deadline for filing the consolidated financial statements is brought forward by one month, requiring auditors to perform the group audits within a shorter period of time. These changes pose more challenges to the principal auditor when a significant portion of subsidiaries are audited by other auditors. Therefore, we predict that the audit complexity and audit risk associated with the involvement of other auditors have become a more important consideration in the principal auditor's audit pricing in the post-IFRS period.
Using 2,242 firm-year observations from firms listed on the Korea Exchange (KRX) for the period between 2005 and 2013, we find that, in the pre-IFRS period, audit fees paid by the parent company to the principal auditor are negatively associated with the proportion of total assets or sales audited by other auditors. This result suggests that the principal auditor considers subsidiaries audited by other auditors as potential clients and thus offers audit fee discounts to the parent company before IFRS adoption. Second, we find that the relation between audit fees and the involvement of other auditors becomes insignificant in the post-IFRS period. This finding suggests that, after IFRS adoption, the principal auditor increases audit fees charged to the parent company when a significant part of the subsidiaries are audited by other auditors, reflecting the increased audit effort and risk associated with the involvement of other auditors. Third, when we partition the sample periods into three sub-periods (i.e., the pre-IFRS period, transition period, and post-IFRS period), we find that the association between audit fees and the involvement of other auditors generally changes from significantly negative in the pre-IFRS period, to insignificant or significantly positive in the transition and post-IFRS periods. Taken together, our results suggest that the principal auditor strategically charges low audit fees to the parent company to acquire the subsidiaries as future clients when the audit complexity and risk associated with the involvement of other auditors are relatively low (i.e., in the pre-IFRS period). IFRS, however, restrict principal auditors' opportunistic behavior in audit pricing by increasing the audit complexity and risk associated with the involvement of other auditors.
We also provide evidence that the principal auditor is indeed successful in acquiring the client's subsidiaries that are audited by other auditors. Specifically, while some results are weak, we find that the involvement of other auditors decreases with the tenure of the principal auditor, as other auditors are replaced with auditors who are affiliated with the principal auditor during the tenure, particularly earlier in the tenure. This pattern exists only in the pre-IFRS period but not in the transition and post-IFRS periods. Overall, these results support our argument that principal auditors strategically offer fee discounts to their clients to attract business from the client's subsidiaries when these subsidiaries are audited by other auditors.
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, our study contributes to the audit pricing literature by suggesting the involvement of other auditors as a potential determinant of audit fees. Prior studies find that audit fees are determined by client size and audit task complexity (Simunic 1980) , firm-specific litigation risk (Seetharaman, Gul, and Lynn 2002; Hay, Knechel, and Wong 2006; Badertscher, Jorgensen, Kats, and Kinney 2014) , demand for advisory services (Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew 2003) , relationship between auditors and clients (Higgs and Skantz 2006; Choi, Kim, and Zang 2010) , auditor characteristics (Craswell, Francis, and Taylor 1995) , audit quality (Francis 1984; DeFond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam 2002; Krishnan, Sami, and Zhang 2005; Hoitash, Markelevich, and Barragato 2007) , and changes in the audit environment (Huang, Raghunandan, and Rama 2009; Krishnan, Krishnan, and Song 2011; Kim et al. 2012; De George et al. 2013) . Prior studies, however, have not investigated whether the involvement of other auditors in the audit of group financial statements affects audit fees.
Second, our study is one of the few that directly examines whether auditors strategically determine audit fees to capture potential business opportunities. Several prior studies provide empirical evidence that auditors offer fee discounts on initial audit engagements (Francis and Simon 1987; Walker and Casterella 2000) or when potential economic benefits from non-audit services are expected (Huang et al. 2009 ). While these prior studies focus on the auditor-client relationship, our study shows that auditors also view the audits of the client's subsidiaries as potential business opportunities.
Third, our study enhances our understanding of the effect of IFRS on the audit environment by providing evidence that IFRS adoption mitigates auditors' opportunistic behavior in audit pricing. While Kim et al. (2012) provide useful insights into how IFRS influence audit pricing, our finding suggests that the involvement of other auditors intensifies audit complexity after IFRS adoption.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section contains a review of the literature, a discussion of the institutional setting in Korea, and our hypotheses. The third section specifies the empirical models we use to test our hypotheses. The fourth section contains our main empirical results. The fifth section details additional analyses, and the final section concludes the paper.
INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES

Institutional Settings in Korea
On March 16, 2007, the Korean government announced a road map to IFRS adoption.
Voluntary adoption of IFRS was permitted from 2009, but from 2011 onwards (FSS 2007), IFRS
became mandatory for all listed companies in Korea. 4 IFRS adoption has greatly changed the accounting and auditing practices in Korea. While K-GAAP are more rules-based and historical cost-oriented, IFRS are principles-based and fair value-oriented, requiring management and auditors to make more professional judgement. Under K-GAAP, non-consolidated financial statements are the primary financial statements that must be submitted as a part of annual reports, which should be filed within 90 days after the fiscal year end.
The consolidated financial statements are regarded as relatively less important under K-GAAP and thus are required to be additionally filed within four months after the fiscal year end (i.e., one month after the non-consolidated financial statements are filed). In the post-IFRS period, however, the consolidated financial statements replace the non-consolidated financial statements as a primary reporting method, which shortens the deadline by a month for filing the audited consolidated financial statements as a part of annual reports. This change has increased the demand for audit resources because the majority of Korean firms have December fiscal year ends and all of their audits must be done within a limited 90-day window.
Another institutional feature of the Korean audit market is that Generally Accepted Auditing Standards in Korea (hereafter, 'K-GAAS') allow the parent company's auditor to refer to the audits of other auditors who audit subsidiaries' financial statements. K-GAAS also allow the parent company's auditor to skip additional audit procedures relating to the subsidiaries' financial statements that are audited by other auditors. As a result, the auditor of the parent company has a limited responsibility when other auditors are involved. 5 When the work by other auditors is used in forming the group audit opinion, the principal auditor discloses the amount of work performed by other auditors (i.e., the proportion of total assets or sales of subsidiaries audited by other auditors) in audit reports. A survey by the Korean Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) suggests that 39% of audit reports for the consolidated financial statements in 2012 make reference to the audits of other auditors (FSS 2014) .
Development of Hypotheses
The consolidated, or group, financial statements are the financial statements of a group in which the assets, liabilities, equity, income, expenses, and cash flows of the parent and its subsidiaries are presented as those of a single economic entity. Accounting and auditing 5 However, K-GAAS were amended in 2012 to be consistent with ISA. The revised K-GAAS, effective for annual periods beginning on or after December 31, 2013, tighten the responsibility of the parent company's auditors. For example, making reference to the audits of the components auditors in audit reports is not allowed. To rule out the potential impact of the change in auditing standards, we do not include the period after 2014 in our sample. When the component auditors are affiliated with the principal auditor (e.g., other engagement teams in the same accounting firm or other member firms located in other countries), the problem of audit complexity and risk can be mitigated to some extent because it is easier to communicate and coordinate within the same network. In line with the argument that non-audit services increase audit efficiency through knowledge spillover (Simunic 1984; Palmrose 1986; Sharma 2014) poor-quality audit services to the components or if the work performed by other auditors is not adequately planned and supervised by the principal auditor due to differences in audit 7 Using Korean data, Sohn, Oh, and Lee (2009) find that the involvement of other auditors is positively associated with reporting lags as well as with the magnitude of difference in the net income between the non-consolidated and the consolidated financial statements. They argue that the timeliness and reliability of accounting information deteriorate as the involvement of other auditors increases.
methodologies. Taken together, principal auditors would reflect the increase in audit complexity and risk into higher audit fees ('the audit complexity view').
Alternatively, principal auditors may view the subsidiaries audited by other auditors as potential business opportunities ('the business opportunity view'). Given that the parent company can influence the choice of independent auditors of its subsidiaries, the principal auditor can target the subsidiaries audited by other auditors by leveraging its auditor-client relationship with the parent company. For example, the principal auditor may request that subsidiaries are audited by auditors affiliated with the principal auditor to achieve more efficient communication among auditors and to ensure the overall quality of the group audit. This might happen even if the subsidiaries have their own governing bodies to appoint auditors. The case of Company A, a parent company with several subsidiaries located in Korea and overseas, illustrates this possibility. 8 As presented in Table 1 [Insert Table 1 here]
In summary, the principal auditor has two competing considerations in determining the parent company's audit fees. The subsidiaries that are audited by other auditors can increase audit complexity and audit risk, but they can also provide the principal auditor with new business opportunities. Although the question of which factor dominates in audit pricing is an empirical one, we predict that the business opportunity view is stronger than the audit complexity view before the adoption of IFRS in Korea for the following reasons. First, investor protection is weak and litigation risk is relatively low in Korea (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1998; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2006), and auditors therefore may act opportunistically in the pre-IFRS period to maximize their profits as long as they evaluate the associated risk to be relatively low. Second, both the significance of consolidated financial statements and their scrutiny are low in the pre-IFRS period because the consolidated financial statements are not the primary financial statements under K-GAAP, and consequently, the audit complexity and risk arising from the involvement of other auditors in the group audit are relatively low. Finally, in the pre-IFRS period, an additional one month is allowed for consolidation, which gives the principal auditor more time to manage both the audit complexity and risk associated with the involvement of other auditors. Based on this discussion, we develop our first hypothesis in the alternative form as follows:
H1: Audit fees charged to the parent company is negatively associated in the pre-IFRS period with the involvement of other auditors in the audit of the group financial statements.
We expect that auditors face increased audit complexity and risk after IFRS adoption. As previously discussed, IFRS adoption has caused a structural shift in the accounting and auditing practices in Korea. Schipper (2003) argues that principles-based standards such as IFRS require higher levels of expertise from firms and their auditors and also require both to exercise more judgment about estimates and measurements. Similarly, Marden and Brackney (2009) argue that the inherent flexibility of IFRS increases audit risk as a result of the increased complexity of audit tasks. Therefore, the increase in audit task complexity and audit risk after the adoption of IFRS is expected to lead to an increase in audit fees. Using a dataset of Australian companies, De George et al. (2013) find that audit fees increased by 23 percent in the year of IFRS adoption and that the increase in audit fees was greater for firms with greater exposure to audit complexity, as measured by the magnitude of IFRS-adjustments made to total equity. Kim et al. (2012) investigate the impact of IFRS on audit fees using data from EU countries that adopted IFRS in 2005. They find that mandatory IFRS adoption has led to an increase in audit fees. They also show that the IFRSrelated audit fee premium increases with the extent of accounting differences between a country's former local GAAP and IFRS, suggesting that the increase in audit task complexity is one of the driving forces behind the IFRS-related audit fee increase.
To confirm the finding in previous studies on the effect of IFRS adoption on audit fees and to use it as a basis for the next hypothesis, we test the relation between IFRS adoption and audit fees in Korea using our sample. We state the second hypothesis as follows:
H2: IFRS adoption has increased audit fees in Korea.
As discussed previously, the consolidated financial statements have become the primary financial statements in Korea following the adoption of IFRS and the amount of time to perform audits on these statements has been shortened by one month. Consequently, these changes have intensified audit complexity and increased audit risk, particularly when a substantial portion of the group financial statements are audited by other auditors who are not affiliated with the principal auditor.
These fundamental changes to the audit environment as a result of IFRS adoption are predicted to affect the pricing of audit services when other auditors are involved. In the post-IFRS period, in which the audit complexity and risk associated with the involvement of other auditors are increased, the principal auditor's desire to attract a client's subsidiaries may have become a second-order consideration. In other words, in the post-IFRS period, principal auditors consider subsidiaries audited by other auditors more as a source of audit complexity and risk rather than as a business opportunity. Therefore, the fee discounts given in the pre-IFRS period to parent companies with several subsidiaries audited by other auditors would be reduced, thereby leading to a less negative relation between audit fees and the involvement of other auditors in the post-IFRS period than it is in the pre-IFRS period. Based on this discussion, we develop our third hypothesis in the alternative form as follows:
The relation between audit fees charged to the parent company and the involvement of other auditors in the audit of the group financial statements is less negative in the post-IFRS period than it is in the pre-IFRS period.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA
Research Design
To test our hypotheses, we use the following regression model that includes the test variables for the involvement of other auditors (OTHER), IFRS adoption (IFRS), their interaction, and other control variables:
AUDFEEi,t = β0 + β1 OTHERi, t + β2 IFRSi, t + β3 OTHERi, t×IFRSi, t+ β4 SUBSIDIARYi, t + β5 LNTAi, t + β6 CROSSi, t + β7 BIG4i, t + β8 INITIALi, t + β9 HHIi, t + β10 LEVi, t + β11LIQi, t + β12 ISSUEi, t + β13 CFOi, t + β14 LOSSi, t + β15 ROAi, t + β16 INVRECi, t + β17 GRWi, t + β18 BTMi, t + β19 FOREIGNi, t (1) The variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Our dependent variable, AUDFEE, is measured as the natural logarithm of audit fees charged to a parent company by the principal auditor in Korean won (KRW), as disclosed in the annual report of the parent company. As such, our audit fee measure does not include audit fees paid by the subsidiaries to the component auditors who are affiliated with the principal auditor or those paid to other auditors (i.e., component auditors who are not affiliated with the principal auditor). Because our audit fee measure reflects a decision made solely by the principal auditor in audit pricing for its own client, the measure is capable of capturing the principal auditor's strategic behaviour in audit pricing, if any, and its own risk assessment of the involvement of other auditors. The extent to which other auditors are involved in the group audit, OTHER, is measured as the proportion of total assets (sales) of subsidiaries audited by other auditors in the group financial statements (ASSETCOVER (SALESCOVER)). The coefficient on OTHER (β1) captures the effect of the involvement of other auditors on the principal auditor's audit pricing in the pre-IFRS period. If the principal auditor views the subsidiaries audited by other auditors more as a business opportunity rather than as a source of audit complexity and risk and thus offers a fee discount to its client in the pre-IFRS period, we predict β1 to be negative (i.e., H1).
We test the effect of IFRS adoption on audit fees (H2) based on the coefficient on IFRS (β2).
IFRS is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for the post-IFRS period (2011) (2012) (2013) and zero for the pre-IFRS period (2005) (2006) (2007) . Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Kim et al. 2012 ; De
+ β20 LARGESTi,t + Σβ Year + Σ Industry + εit
George et al. 2013), we predict β2 to be positive. In estimating Equation (1), we do not include the transition period (2008) (2009) (2010) because some firms voluntarily adopted IFRS in this period and auditors may have already incorporated the anticipated effect of IFRS adoption into their audit pricing. Figure 1 shows the time period analyzed in our empirical tests.
[Insert Figure 1 here] Our variable of interest in testing H3 is the coefficient on OTHER×IFRS (β3). β3 reflects the incremental change in audit fees associated with the involvement of other auditors from the pre-IFRS to the post-IFRS period. If the post-IFRS increase in the audit complexity and risk associated with the involvement of other auditors mitigates the principal auditor's economic incentive to lowball the parent company's audit fees, we predict β3 to be positive.
Following prior studies on audit fees (e.g., Hay et al. 2006) , we include several control variables that are known to affect audit fees. We include client size (LNTA), the number of subsidiaries (SUBSIDIARY), and the amount of inventory and accounts receivable (INVREC). The model controls for client-specific audit risk by including leverage (LEV), liquidity (LIQ, CFO), financing activities (ISSUE), and profitability (LOSS, ROA) (Simunic 1980; Francis 1984; Seetharaman et al. 2002; Hay et al. 2006) . We also control for sales growth (GRW) and the bookto-market ratio (BTM) of the client. We include an indicator variable for Big 4 auditors (BIG4) and an indicator variable for initial audit engagements (INITIAL) to control for a Big 4 auditor fee premium (DeFond, Francis, and Wong 2000; Choi, Kim, Liu, and Simunic 2008) and initial fee discounts (Francis and Simon 1987; Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant 2009), respectively. 9 The model also includes the Herfindahl index (HHI) as a measure of competition in the audit market segment. Audit fees can be positively associated with market concentration if there is less price competition in a highly concentrated market (Simunic 1980; Willekens and Achmadi 2003) .
Alternatively, audit fees and market concentration can be negatively associated if higher market concentration indicates increased price competition among market leaders (Pearson and Trompeter 1994) . We include an indicator variable for cross-listed firms (CROSS) since Choi, Kim, Liu, and Simunic (2009) find that auditors charge an audit fee premium for cross-listed firms. To control for governance structures, we include foreign ownership (FOREIGN) and the largest shareholder ownership (LARGEST). Finally, we include year and industry fixed effects in the model.
Sample
The initial sample consists of all firms listed on the Korea Exchange (KRX) with December fiscal year ends for the period from 2005 to 2013. We remove firms in the financial industry because their operating activities and financial reporting environments differ from those in other industries. We collect financial data from the KIS-Value database developed by the Korea Information Service (KIS), which is affiliated with Moody's. We manually collect data on audit fees and audit hours from the annual reports, and we also collect information on the proportion of total assets (sales) audited by other auditors from independent auditors' reports. These reports are publicly available on the website called DART (http://dart.fss.or.kr). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
Panel A of Table 2 presents the sample selection process. After excluding observations with missing data, the final sample is 2,242 firm-year observations for the period from 2005 to 2013.
As presented in Panel B, firm-year observations are evenly distributed across years. Panel C presents the sample distribution by 2-digit industry code, and we find that the manufacturing industry accounts for the majority (65%) of our sample.
[Insert Table 2 here]
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 3 Finally, Panel C of Table 3 reports the Pearson correlations among the selected variables.
Audit fees (AUDFEE) and audit hours (AUDHOUR) are positively correlated with the adoption of IFRS (IFRS) at the 1% level. (2010), we report the t-statistics in parentheses based on robust standard errors clustered by both firm and year.
Regression Results
The coefficients on ASSETCOVER (-0.218; t-statistic = -2.97) in Column (1) and SALESCOVER (-0.169; t-statistic = -2.49) in Column (2) are negative and significant. This result suggests that the principal auditor offers audit fee discounts to its clients with several subsidiaries audited by other auditors in the pre-IFRS period, thus supporting our first hypothesis. In terms of economic significance, a 10% increase in ASSETCOVER (SALESCOVER) is associated with a 2.18% (1.69%) decrease in audit fees paid by the parent company. The coefficient on IFRS, which reflects the effect of IFRS adoption on audit fees when the involvement of other auditors is zero, is positive and significant in Column (1), consistent with our second hypothesis that IFRS adoption 13 One may expect that the demand for Big 4 auditors increases in the post-IFRS period, compared to the pre-IFRS period, because audits become more complex after IFRS adoption. However, this univariate comparison does not support this claim. We also estimate the auditor selection model for Big 4 auditors and find no effect of IFRS adoption on the selection of Big 4 auditors.
increases audit fees. The coefficient on IFRS in Column (2) The coefficients on the control variables are generally consistent with our expectations.
Specifically, audit fees are positively associated with client size (LNTA), audit task and client
complexity (SUBSIDIARY, INVREC), cross-listing (CROSS), and client-specific risks (LEV).
14 When the interaction between IFRS and SALESCOVER is not included in the model, the coefficient on IFRS (0.128; t-statistic = 3.74) is positive and significant, suggesting that IFRS adoption on average increases audit fees in Korea.
Audit fees are negatively associated with liquidity (LIQ), profitability (ROA), and recent financing activities (ISSUE). The positive coefficients on BIG4 are consistent with the fee premium for Big 4 auditors, and the negative coefficients on INITIAL are consistent with auditors lowballing for initial audit engagements. Finally, the book-to-market ratio (BTM) is negatively associated with audit fees, reflecting high audit complexity and client-specific risk of growth firms.
[Insert Table 4 here]
To provide evidence on the relation between audit fees and the involvement of other auditors separately for three different sample periods, we partition the sample into three sub-periods (i.e., the pre-IFRS, transition, and post-IFRS periods), and re-estimate Equation (1) 
after dropping the variables relating to IFRS adoption (IFRS and OTHER×IFRS). In addition, we include an indicator variable for voluntary early adoption of IFRS (EARLY) in the model for the transition period, to
address the effect of voluntary adoption of IFRS on audit fees. 15 Table 5 presents the results. In the pre-IFRS period, the coefficients on ASSETCOVER (-0.327; t-statistic = -3.90) and SALESCOVER (-0.259; t-statistic = -3.37) are negative and significant at the 1% level, as presented in Columns (1) and (2). This finding is consistent with the business opportunity view: principal auditors try to increase their business by offering fee discounts to the clients, thus poaching business from other auditors. In the transition period, the coefficient on ASSETCOVER (0.121; tstatistic = 1.71) is positive and significant in Column (3), while the coefficient on SALESCOVER The results on the control variables are largely consistent with those presented in Table 4 , while some differences are noteworthy. Specifically, we find that the coefficients on foreign (3) and (4) are significantly positive in the transition period, reflecting that auditors charge higher audit fees for firms that voluntarily adopted IFRS before the mandatory adoption.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Taken together, the results reported in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that the principal auditor considers subsidiaries audited by other auditors as a business opportunity in the pre-IFRS period, in which the audit complexity and risk associated with the involvement of other auditors are relatively low. In the post-IFRS period, however, this strategic behaviour in audit pricing is restricted (i.e., principal auditors no longer provide fee discounts to their clients with several subsidiaries audited by other auditors) by the change in the audit environment.
ADDITIONAL TESTS The Relation between Auditor Tenure and the Involvement of Other Auditors
To provide supporting evidence for our argument of strategic audit pricing, we test the relation between auditor tenure and the involvement of other auditors. If the principal auditor is successful at gaining business from the client's subsidiaries audited by other auditors through offering an audit fee discount to the parent company, we expect that the proportion of assets (sales) audited by other auditors decreases with the tenure of the principal auditor. We also expect that this negative relation between auditor tenure and the involvement of other auditors is more pronounced earlier in the tenure than it is later in the tenure because the principal auditor seeks to recover its fee discount as early as possible by acquiring the client's subsidiaries. Table 6 reports the results. In Column (1) of Panel A, the coefficient on TENURE (-0.011;
t-statistic = -1.47) is negative but insignificant when ASSETCOVER is used as the dependent variable, and it is significantly negative (-0.014; t-statistic = -1.76) at the 10% level in Column (2) when SALESCOVER is used as the dependent variable, generally supporting our prediction that the principal auditor acquires the client's subsidiaries as their own clients while working as the auditor of the parent company. Next, we partition the full sample into firm-year observations with short tenure (i.e., ≤ 5 years) and those with long tenure, and re-estimate the model separately for these two groups. The coefficients on TENURE are negative and significant at the 10% levels in
Columns (3) and (4) for the short tenure group (-0.025; t-statistic = -1.93 for ASSETCOVER and -0.026; t-statistic = -1.83 for SALESCOVER, respectively). On the other hand, the coefficients on TENURE are not significant in Columns (5) and (6) for the longer tenure group. These findings suggest that the acquisition of new clients is concentrated earlier in the tenure.
Next, we perform the sub-period analysis using the short-tenure group only. As presented in
Panel B of Table 6 , the coefficient on TENURE (-0.023; t-statistic = -1.82) is significantly negative in Column (1) when ASSETCOVER is used as the dependent variable, while it is negative and marginally insignificant in Column (2) when SALESCOVER is used. This finding, albeit weak, is generally consistent with the results reported in Panel A that the involvement of other auditors decreases as the tenure of the principal auditor becomes longer. On the other hand, the results for the transition and pre-IFRS periods in Columns (3) through (6) are all insignificant, suggesting that the strategy of acquiring new clients works in the pre-IFRS period only. Overall, although some of our results are insignificant or significant only at the 10% levels, our results on the negative relation between auditor tenure and the involvement of other auditors generally support our claim that the principal auditor acquires its client's subsidiaries by providing fee discounts to the parent company.
Alternative Audit Fee Measure
While we use audit fees paid by the parent company to the principal auditor as the dependent variable for the main tests, we check the robustness of our findings to an alternative measurement of audit fees as the sum of (i) audit fees paid by the parent company to the principal auditor and
(ii) audit fees paid by the subsidiaries to the component auditors who are affiliated with the principal auditor. Because audit fees paid by subsidiaries are not disclosed by the parent company and audit fee data are publicly available only for public companies, we can construct this alternative fee measure only for a limited sample given the lack of available data. Specifically, we download the list of subsidiaries for each parent company and then match our hand-collected audit fee data for each of the public subsidiaries. Due to data limitations, we can measure audit fees paid to the component auditors who are affiliated with the principal auditor only when (i) the parent company has at least one public subsidiary in Korea and (ii) at least one of the component auditors is affiliated with the principal auditor. These requirements, particularly the first one for the existence of public subsidiaries, significantly restrict the sample, reducing the sample size from 2,242 to 256. When we estimate the model using this reduced sample, our main findings remain unchanged (untabulated). Specifically, the coefficients on OTHER are significantly negative in the pre-IFRS period, but they are insignificant in the transition and post-IFRS periods. 16 Overall, we believe that our main inferences are not affected by using the alternative measurement of audit fees.
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Types of Other Auditors
The audit effort and risk associated with the involvement of other auditors are expected to be relatively low for the subsidiaries audited by Big 4 auditors compared to those audited by nonBig 4 auditors because Big 4 auditors provide higher-quality audit services than non-Big 4 auditors do. In addition, to the extent that the clients of Big 4 auditors tend to be large firms (and thus their audit fees are high), the principal auditor's incentive to get the business of the subsidiaries audited by other auditors is expected to be stronger when the subsidiaries are audited by Big 4 auditors.
Therefore, we predict that fee discounts offered to the parent companies with subsidiaries audited by other auditors are greater when the subsidiaries are audited by Big 4 auditors than when they 16 We believe that this alternative method may provide a noisier measure of audit fees in testing the principal auditor's strategic audit pricing because (i) audit fees for the subsidiaries may not be discounted and (ii) the audit fee decisions may not be coordinated within the network. 17 We also note that, when a parent company is a holding company, audit fees paid to the parent company (i.e., the dependent variable) may not reflect the characteristics of the group financial statements. When we repeat our analyses after excluding holding companies (189 firm-year observations) or after including an indicator variable for holding companies as a control variable, we find similar results.
are audited by non-Big 4 auditors because the assessed risk is relatively low and the incentive for business is high for the clients of Big 4 auditors. To examine this prediction, we construct the proportion of assets (sales) of subsidiaries audited by other auditors separately for Big 4 and NonBig 4 auditors (OTHER_BIG4 and OTHER_NonBIG4, respectively) using the available data.
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We find that fee discounts are greater for the subsidiaries audited by Big 4 auditors than they are for those audited by non-Big 4 auditors and that this pattern is observed in the pre-IFRS period only (untabulated). Specifically, the coefficients on OTHER_BIG4 are significantly negative in the pre-IFRS period while the coefficients on OTHER_NonBIG4 are not significant. On the other hand, the coefficients on both OTHER_BIG4 and OTHER_NonBIG4 are insignificant in the post-IFRS period, consistent with our main findings. Taken together, this additional analysis suggests that the principal auditor incorporates information about the types of other auditors into its audit pricing.
Alternative Model Specifications
Our use of the continuous variables for ASSETCOVER and SALESCOVER in the main tests implicitly assumes a linear relation between (the log of) audit fees and the involvement of other auditors. To examine a potential nonlinear relation, we form quartiles based on ASSETCOVER (SALESCOVER) and define indicator variables for each quartile group. When we estimate the model with the indicator variables for the second, third, and fourth quartiles (rather than the continuous variables of ASSETCOVER (SALESCOVER)), we find that the relation between audit fees and the involvement of other auditors in the pre-IFRS period is significantly negative for the fourth quartile of ASSETCOVER (SALESCOVER) but not for the second and third quartiles. This finding suggests that principal auditors offer fee discounts to their clients only when the involvement of other auditors is sufficiently high (i.e., there are sufficiently high opportunities to attract new clients). On the other hand, in the transition and post-IFRS periods, all the indicator variables for the second, third, and fourth quartiles of ASSETCOVER (SALESCOVER) are insignificant, consistent with our main inference that the fee discounts associated with the involvement of other auditors disappear in the post-IFRS period. When we use the partition based on the mean value and the standard deviation of ASSETCOVER (SALESCOVER) (i.e., mean-σ, mean, mean+ σ), we find similar results: fee discounts are observed only when the involvement of other auditors is high. Overall, these findings are consistent with principal auditors providing fee discounts to their clients when there is a sufficiently high probability of attracting new clients.
Other Additional Tests
We conduct a number of additional and untabulated tests to check the robustness of our findings. First, to address the possibility that our results are affected by outliers, we perform two tests: (1) we estimate the model using the median regression method and (2) we re-estimate the model after eliminating observations that are greater than |3σ|. Our inferences do not change.
Second, to address potential problems arising from using panel data in the regressions, we estimate the regression using the corrected t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the firm level (instead of two-way clustered standard errors used for our main analyses) with the year and industry fixed effects. We find that our main results are not affected. Third, as audit fees are usually determined based on the client's financial information from the previous year, we use lagged values for the determinants of audit fees to re-estimate the model and find similar results. Fourth, we re-estimate Equation (1) using audit fees adjusted by the Consumer Price Index and find similar results. Finally, we examine the relation between the involvement of other auditors and the number of audit hours, which reflects the level of audit effort. When the number of audit hours is used as the dependent variable in the multivariate regression, we find that audit hours increase significantly after IFRS adoption. However, we do not find significant results for OTHER or OTHER×IFRS.
One possible interpretation is that when other auditors are involved, the principal auditor does not increase their audit effort and instead increases their risk premium. However, we are cautious about drawing inferences based on audit hour data because the data represent aggregated hours spent by partners, senior staff, and junior staff and thus are noisy.
CONCLUSION
We examine the principal auditor's audit pricing when other auditors who are not affiliated with the principal auditor are involved in the group audits. We hypothesize that the parent company's auditor charges higher (lower) audit fees if the principal auditor views subsidiaries audited by other auditors as a source of audit complexity and risk (as a business opportunity to attract new clients). When the audit complexity and risk associated with the involvement of other auditors are relatively low (i.e., pre-IFRS period), the business opportunity view is expected to dominate the audit complexity view. We also hypothesize that auditors' opportunistic behavior in audit pricing is mitigated in the post-IFRS period as the mandatory adoption of IFRS increases the audit complexity and risk associated with the involvement of other auditors. Using data from Korea, we find that audit fees charged to the parent company by the principal auditor are negatively associated with the proportion of total assets or sales of subsidiaries audited by other auditors in the pre-IFRS period, consistent with the business opportunity view. In the post-IFRS period, however, this negative relation becomes insignificant or positive. Our findings contribute to the literature by providing empirical evidence on auditors' strategic audit pricing and the impact of regulatory changes on the pricing of audit services. , where i is the auditor of the parent company and s is the market share in the audit segment (two-digit industry code) based on audit fees; LEV = the leverage, measured as total liabilities divided by total assets; LIQ = the liquidity ratio, measured as current assets divided by current liabilities; ISSUE = an indicator variable equal to one if the sum of debt and equity issued during the past three years is more than 5% of the total assets, and zero otherwise; CFO = cash flows from operating activities divided by total assets at the end of the fiscal year; LOSS = an indicator variable equal to one if the firm reports a loss in the year, and zero otherwise; ROA = return on assets, measured as net income divided by total assets at the end of the fiscal year; INVREC = the sum of inventory and accounts receivable divided by total assets; GRW = the change in sales from the prior year to the current year scaled by lagged total assets; BTM = the book-to-market ratio, measured as net assets divided by the market value of common stocks; FOREIGN = the ownership held by foreign investors; LARGEST = the ownership held by the largest shareholders and related parties; EARLY = an indicator variable equal to one if the firm voluntarily adopts IFRS in the transition period, and zero otherwise; and AUDHOUR = audit hours measured by the natural log of the number of audit hours. This case is from Choi et al. (2014) . In 2007 
